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**RETHINKING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS IRAQ:  
KEEP CONTAINMENT, FORGET THE SANCTIONS**

**CORE COURSE 4 ESSAY**

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Course 4: The Geostrategic Context  
Seminar C  
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## INTRODUCTION

In the wake of the Gulf War, struggling to deal with a still-recalcitrant and hostile Saddam, the Clinton administration fell back on a proven Cold War strategy--containment--as a means to protect American interests in the Persian Gulf. First outlined in a May 1993 speech by Martin Indyk, the Special Assistant to the President for Near East and South Asian Affairs, the policy of "dual containment" is designed to allow Washington and its allies to contain Iraq while countering Iran at the same time. Dual containment uses sustained economic, diplomatic, and military pressure to isolate both countries, cut them off from the world trading system, and, (at least in the case of Iraq) encourage a change of regime.<sup>1</sup> In conjunction with an aggressive military presence and proactive diplomacy, a key feature of Iraqi containment has been relentless enforcement of economic sanctions. These sanctions--particularly the embargo on the sale of oil--are intended to force Iraq to comply with U N resolutions considered essential to long-term stability in the Middle East.<sup>2</sup>

To date, this containment policy has arguably been quite successful. While it has not gotten rid of Saddam, it has isolated and impoverished the Iraqis while further reducing their military capability. But it has also been subject to intense criticism as overzealous, unrealistic, and inhumane.<sup>3</sup> In response, the Clinton administration has moved quickly to defend the policy. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, in a widely-read Foreign Affairs article entitled "Confronting Backlash States", maintained that dual containment is in fact "a realistic and sustainable policy that takes into account U S interests and the realities of the Persian Gulf region."<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, as

sanctions come up once more for renewal in the U.N. Security Council, containment in general, and sanctions in particular, are again under heavy domestic and international pressure<sup>5</sup>

Despite the points raised by such criticism, there are compelling reasons to "stay the course"--to maintain a firm policy of containing Iraq. However, it is also time to modify the economic sanctions, which in many ways have become counterproductive to the overall strategy of containment. To prove this outward paradox--that we should hold firm on containment while at the same time easing up on sanctions--this paper first argues that containing Saddam's Iraq is an appropriate and necessary strategy. It then explains why, within the context of containment, most economic sanctions on Iraq can and should be lifted.

### **MAINTAINING CONTAINMENT...**

The first and best reason for maintaining a firm policy of containment of Iraq is because it's necessary. To term Saddam's Iraq a "rogue state" by this point is trite--but also true. As Indyk put it, "the current regime in Iraq is a criminal regime, beyond the pale of international society and, in our view, irredeemable."<sup>6</sup> Saddam cannot be changed, his behavior cannot be "modified". Without exaggeration, it's truthful to say that Iraq has been relentlessly dangerous, unpredictable, and hostile to American, Western, and Gulf state interests. Though much reduced by losses in the war and the ensuing sanctions, Iraq's military forces nevertheless remain the strongest in the region.<sup>7</sup> There is also strong evidence that despite the work of an extremely intrusive

inspection regime, Saddam remains committed to eventually developing weapons of mass destruction.<sup>8</sup> Nor is there any reason to believe he has backed off from his true long-term goal--to dominate the Persian Gulf and the world's supply of oil.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, the Iraqi government has been implicated in an (albeit inept) attempt to assassinate former President Bush, fired on coalition forces patrolling the no-fly zone, and forcefully interfered with efforts to provide relief to Iraqi Kurds.<sup>10</sup> Most recently, in November 1994, Saddam once again threatened Kuwait in what many saw as a bizarre attempt to force the U.N. to lift the sanctions.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, as a new U.N. Human Rights Commission report graphically reveals, Saddam continues to abuse, starve and torture his own people.<sup>12</sup> Significantly, well-known Middle East analyst Graham Fuller, author of the RAND study Iraq in the Next Decade, recently concluded at a symposium on dual containment: "I do not see that the Iraqi regime is going to be capable of change as long as Saddam is there."<sup>13</sup> So it's contain Iraq now or fight Iraq again later--those are the choices.

Furthermore, an isolated, contained Iraq cannot seriously threaten America's interests. According to Lake, "The basic strategic principle in the Persian Gulf region is to establish a favorable balance of power, one that will protect critical American interests in the security of our friends and in the free flow of oil at stable prices."<sup>14</sup> A caged Saddam cannot interrupt the world's oil supply. Nor can he as easily bully his neighbors, disrupt the Arab-Israeli peace process, or cynically manipulate Palestinian public opinion.<sup>15</sup> Just as importantly, Iraq is, according to RAND, "one of the most dangerous proliferators of weapons of mass destruction in the world today."<sup>16</sup> If

nonproliferation is a vital U S. interest, then surely this is a test case of how we will enforce it. The strategy of containment recently proved very successful during Saddam's failed move against Kuwait in October 1994. As Gerald Butt, writing in Middle East International pointed out, "Kuwait can never have felt so comfortable about its future security ..Iraq, on the other hand, can never have felt so isolated."<sup>17</sup>

Another attractive feature of the dual containment policy, besides its effectiveness and necessity, is that it avoids the now-discredited approach of building up one of the traditional Gulf "strongmen" to counter the other. Dual containment thus explicitly rejects "the tempting realpolitik of playing the Middle East's two most troublesome countries against each other"<sup>18</sup>, a policy that was responsible, in part, for the growth of Saddam's regional strength in the first place. However, some of the most vocal critics of Iraqi containment, such as F. Gregory Gause, have argued that Iran is the greater threat, and that "A weak Iraq is an inviting target for an Iran 'contained' and isolated "<sup>19</sup> But cynics who argue that we must forego containment, and instead allow Iraq to build up to counter the emerging danger posed by Iran, simply do not understand the nature of the current balance of power between the two long-time adversaries. First, despite recent arms purchases, Iran is far too weak militarily to seriously threaten a still relatively strong Iraq<sup>20</sup> Additionally, according to Michael Eisenstadt in his study of the emerging Iranian threat. "Because the main threat posed by Iran is its desire to acquire nuclear weapons and its capacity for subversion in the region, Iraq is poorly suited to counterbalance Iran...Balancing Iran in the nuclear arena would logically require rearming Iraq--perhaps with nuclear or

unconventional weapons--thereby creating two threats instead of one."<sup>21</sup> Iranian influence over rebellious Iraqi Shi'ites is also greatly exaggerated. While they may not like Saddam, they do not wish to be dominated by the Persians either.<sup>22</sup>

Conversely, some critics of dual containment have argued, unpersuasively, that to the extent Iran and Iraq are both isolated, they may be driven together in their efforts to resist the West.<sup>23</sup> It is true that, despite their enduring hostility, there has recently been a small measure of cooperation between the two.<sup>24</sup> However, most respected Middle East experts, such as the National Defense University's Phebe Marr, consider any real cooperation between the two countries to be extremely unlikely.<sup>25</sup> As Lake pointed out, "they mistrust each other more than they mistrust the United States."<sup>26</sup>

A final reason to support containment is that while it may, eventually, help get rid of Saddam, there is little concrete evidence that the strategy will lead to the dreaded dismemberment of Iraq. While the Kurdish issue is indeed problematic, the authoritative Iraq in the Next Decade concluded. "The Shi'a, contrary to popular fears in many policy circles, have no intention of separating from Iraq..."<sup>27</sup> Additionally, as Marr has asserted, it is primarily Saddam's government that is ripping the country apart. "Tension between the [Shi'a, Sunni, and Kurdish] communities is perpetuated by the regime, most members of these communities would feel comfortable in an Iraqi state with a different government."<sup>28</sup> So to the extent that containment helps bring an eventual end to Saddam's regime, it may also actually help preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq. And if, unfortunately, containment also results in a bloody coup or

rebellion, well, daily life in Iraq under Saddam's Tikrit gang is pretty bloody already.

### **...WHILE EASING SANCTIONS**

While it is thus critical to preserve Iraqi containment, it is at the same time important that we do so without what have heretofore been the centerpiece of the strategy--the U N. applied sanctions. Currently, these "mandatory sanctions of unprecedented scope" prohibit Iraq from importing most goods except medicine and food, and from exporting oil except under conditions Saddam has adamantly refused to accept<sup>29</sup> However, after almost five years of holding the line, there are now strong reasons why the U.S. should finally acquiesce to the easing of these sanctions, as useful to containment as they may have been

The primary reason to lift, or at least modify, the sanctions is that their effectiveness is diminishing--they have achieved all they are likely to. As structured, the sanctions serve two primary purposes First, they help force compliance with the various U N resolutions instituted before and after the war. Among other things, these resolutions force Iraq to recognize Kuwait, submit to an extremely intrusive inspection regime designed to root out the Iraqi nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons program, and tolerate two no-fly zones designed to help protect the Kurds in the North and the Shi'a in the South.<sup>30</sup> Second, the sanctions are clearly structured to help get rid of Saddam.<sup>31</sup>

In the last few months the Iraqis have made great efforts to comply, at least outwardly, with most resolutions. In November 1994, the Iraqi government officially



recognized Kuwait's independence, which many experts felt was the most humiliating of the resolutions<sup>32</sup> U.N. weapons inspectors have also noted that recently the Iraqis have been much more accommodating than in the past<sup>33</sup> Once the final conditions are met, it would seem that the sanctions will have accomplished all they are likely to toward their first purpose.<sup>34</sup>

The second objective of the sanctions, to encourage a change of regime, is far more problematic. Despite the fact that the sanctions have been "biting" for years, they do not appear to have weakened Saddam's grip on power. There is strong evidence, in fact, that they may now actually be strengthening the regime.<sup>35</sup> Most Iraqis blame the U.S., not Saddam, for the economic shortages which punish them while at the same time enriching Saddam's inner circle.<sup>36</sup> Additionally, as Alan Dowty explained in his Washington Quarterly article, "Sanctioning Iraq": "The dependence of most of the population on the basic rations handed out in a tightly controlled distribution system serves to discourage any challenges, in the Shi'ite areas in particular, the government's control of much of the available food is a powerful weapon."<sup>37</sup> In this sense, the sanctions are hindering, rather than encouraging, a rebellion which might overthrow Saddam. Additionally, those judged most likely to bring an end to the regime--potential military coup plotters and families with well-founded grudges against Saddam--don't need the encouragement of economic deprivation to do what they must.<sup>38</sup>

Sanctions are, as the saying goes, a very blunt instrument--much like "shooting down an airliner in order to stop a hijacker"<sup>39</sup> In this case, they are most hurting

the people we most want to help, and Saddam (unlike President Clinton) doesn't "feel his people's pain". Historically, sanctions have very seldom been effective in removing an opposing leader from power.<sup>40</sup> While the U S. has so far maintained that the sanctions will stay until Saddam is gone, it's time to face the bitter truth that at this point they are counterproductive towards that goal.

Another important reason to ease the sanctions is that the issue is now deeply fraying the anti-Saddam coalition. Alliance solidarity is far more critical to successful containment than whatever value the sanctions may have left. Many countries feel that Iraq has adequately met the conditions imposed by the U.N., and that U S. stubbornness amounts to little more than vindictiveness<sup>41</sup> This is creating something of an anti-American backlash in the region--even some Gulf countries, who have the most to fear from Iraq, have expressed concern.<sup>42</sup> Key nations, such as Russia and France, have strong commercial interests in Iraq and have lobbied hard for lifting of the sanctions.<sup>43</sup> The U.S. case against Iraq just no longer appears to be sufficiently compelling to override European, Russian, Japanese, and Chinese economic calculations. Additionally, regional allies Turkey and Jordan have been badly hurt economically by their (more or less) adherence to the sanctions, and may be forced to break ranks soon.<sup>44</sup> If the sanctions slowly erode, so will the alliance cohesion so critical to the larger goal of containment. Most experts feel the sanctions cannot hold much longer--as Anthony Cordesman put it, "the [sanctions] effort is going to collapse of its own weight.. and we will lose the support of many of the nations of the Gulf."<sup>45</sup> Provided we can salvage some restrictions on the export of military equipment and

dual use technology, let's make a virtue of a necessity and roll on this one

Additionally, America pays a high price in diplomatic flexibility in order to maintain the sanctions on Iraq. For example, we can hardly seriously consider unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnians--over the objections of Britain and France--while at the same time demanding that those nations toe the line on Iraqi sanctions. The diplomatic price we may someday have to pay the Russians and the Chinese for their continuing support could also be high indeed. And friction with the Arab countries over Iraqi sanctions could hurt us when we most need their support for the Arab-Israeli peace process. The sanctions aren't worth it.

Furthermore, we can afford to ease off on sanctions because, contrary to the opinion of many, sanctions are not the real heart of containment. Military power is. In many cases, it was not the sanctions, but the threat or use of force which actually brought Iraqi compliance with the U.N. resolutions. Should Saddam subsequently renounce some of the resolutions after sanctions are lifted (as many people feel he will), threat of force will once again bring compliance. America has successfully used force against Iraq many times now, and provided alliance solidarity holds, Saddam can be sure we will use it again if necessary.<sup>46</sup> Additionally, military enforcement of the no-fly zones has badly damaged Iraqi sovereignty and Saddam's prestige at home, while deterring him from moving as aggressively as he'd like to against those citizens of his country we hope to protect.<sup>47</sup> These zones also help preserve the conditions under which successful revolt, however remote the possibility, could occur. While the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, are and will remain militarily no match for

Saddam's forces, as long as the U S is committed to stay the course in the Gulf containment will work.<sup>48</sup> Ultimately, what we fear is not the Iraqis' discredited ideology, their potential economic strength, or their byzantine diplomacy It's their regional military power. And you counter force with force

Finally, we must realize that merely lifting the sanctions does not equate to a quick resurgence of Iraqi power. Iraq is now a true economic disaster, with a monstrous foreign debt--it owes over \$42 billion to Western institutions alone.<sup>49</sup> According to the Arab Monetary Fund, the Gulf War destroyed an estimated \$190 billion worth of Iraq's infrastructure<sup>50</sup>, and its GDP is now lower than in 1962, when its population was less than half what it is today.<sup>51</sup> Additionally, after 55 months of embargo, Iraq presently has zero oil market share; we can realistically expect the Saudis and Kuwaitis to work through OPEC to preclude an Iraqi oil revenue windfall. It will take a long time for Iraq to come back economically

Furthermore, even some oil money will not necessarily mean a quick rebuilding of their military True, the Iraqis are still the strongest force in the region, and worthy of vigilant containment, but they are also not nearly the overwhelming regional threat they once were.<sup>52</sup> In the opinion of General Hoar, Commander in Chief of U S. Central Command, it will take eight or nine years for Iraq to rebuild its conventional forces to their previous strength, even if international arms restrictions are removed<sup>53</sup> While the Gulf states alone are no match for the Iraqis, American military forces will be sufficient to dominate them for years to come, even without sanctions Furthermore, while we must assume that Saddam will eventually attempt to continue

his clandestine nuclear program, at least the U N. inspection regime, in the words of President Clinton, has "effectively put the Iraqi nuclear weapons program out of business in the near term" <sup>54</sup>

Lifting sanctions, in summary, isn't giving Saddam a break, or letting him off for good behavior. It doesn't mean normalization of relations. It's bowing to the inevitable while realizing that, as useful as sanctions may have been in the past, they are no longer necessary. After all, we have for years successfully isolated Iran and Libya without an oil embargo, and sanctions were never a major part of the Cold War containment of the Soviet Union.

## CONCLUSION

It's time to take a hard look at U S. policy towards Iraq. Despite strong international pressure we must stay the course on containment. Containment of Iraq is both effective and necessary--until Saddam and his entire criminal regime are gone. American interests in the Middle East will not be secure. However, firm containment of Iraq will not lead to the emergence of Iran as the new major threat to the region. It will not force Iran-Iraq rapprochement, nor will it necessarily lead to the "Lebanonization" of the Iraqi nation.

On the other hand, we can and should ease off on the sanctions, which to date have been quite useful but are now in many ways counterproductive to the overall strategy of containment. The sanctions are clearly hurting the Iraqi people. At the same time, they now appear to actually be strengthening the regime, and are thus

unlikely to lead to the goal of getting rid of Saddam. The sanctions also stress the anti-Saddam coalition and cost America diplomatic flexibility in other regions of the world. Most importantly, they are not strictly necessary. American military power, not the sanctions, is the true cornerstone of containment of Iraq. Provided export controls on military hardware and dual use technology remain, the American military presence, together with alliance solidarity and aggressive diplomacy, will be more than sufficient to contain an Iraq that will have trouble recovering even after the sanctions are lifted.

Forty-eight years ago we initiated a policy of containment--without serious sanctions--against a far more powerful outlaw nation. Through patience and firmness we prevailed. We can and must do it again.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," Foreign Affairs 73.2 (1994): 46 , F Gregory Gause III, "The Illogic of Dual Containment," Foreign Affairs 73 2 (1994): 56., and Eric Rouleau, "America's Unyielding Policy Toward Iraq," Foreign Affairs 74.1 (1995). 68

<sup>2</sup> According to Alan Dowty, in the case of Iraq, "Mandatory sanctions of unprecedented scope were adopted with near-universal support and were implemented with the most effective enforcement ever put in place " The sanctions prohibit Iraq from importing most goods except food and medicine, and from exporting oil. The U.N. resolutions which the sanctions help enforce include: Resolution 687, which forces Iraq to renounce all weapons of mass destruction and missiles with a range of more than 150 kilometers, and to pay reparations; Resolution 688, which sets up "safe havens" for Iraqi Kurds, and Resolution 715, which provides for long-term monitoring of the Iraqi weapons program. Additionally, provisions of the resolutions require Iraq to recognize Kuwait, and to respect the human rights of its citizens. A later resolution also set up the "no-fly zones" in the northern and southern regions of the country. The "hardliners" on sanctions are the U.S., Britain, Kuwait, and, to a certain extent, Saudi Arabia. See Alan Dowty, "Sanctioning Iraq," The Washington Quarterly 17.3 (1994): 179-180.

<sup>3</sup> Jack Paterson, "The Sanctions Dilemma," Middle East Research and Information Project 24 2-3 (1994) 24-27 , and Thomas Mattair and Stephen Brannon, "U N. Sanctions Against Iraq," Middle East Policy III.1 (1994) 27, 39.

<sup>4</sup> Lake, 55.

<sup>5</sup> John Lancaster, "Sanctions Impoverish Iraq's Middle Class," Washington Post 11 February 1995. A20 , Jim Hoagland, "Why Ease Up on Iraq?," Washington Post 31 January 1995, A15., and Rouleau, 61-66

<sup>6</sup> Martin Indyk, Address to the Washington Institute, May 18, 1993 Quoted in Mattair, 32.

<sup>7</sup> Contrary to recent "scare stories", such as a June 1993 House Foreign Affairs Committee report, the Iraqis have not significantly rebuilt their conventional forces since the Gulf War. However, they are still relatively the strongest military power in the Persian Gulf. Though the Gulf states have recently made major arms purchases, they remain no match for Iraq without American help. See Martin Indyk, Graham Fuller, Anthony Cordesman, and Phebe Marr, "U S Policy Toward Iran and Iraq Symposium

on Dual Containment," Middle East Policy III.1 (1994). 11-15, 20., and Dowty, 185

<sup>8</sup> President William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Iraq, January 31, 1994," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 30 5 (Washington, D. C.: GPO, 1994), 174., Cordesman, 11-12 , and Dowty, 188.

<sup>9</sup> Laurie Mylroie, "Why Saddam Invaded Kuwait," Orbis (Winter 1993): 123, 125-128., and David E. Long, "Prospects for Armed Conflict in the Gulf in the 1990s: The Impact of the Gulf War," Middle East Policy II.1 (1993): 123.

<sup>10</sup> Clinton, 174-175., and Dowty, 186-187.

<sup>11</sup> While Saddam's action may seem to Westerners to be highly counterproductive, he arguably achieved what he probably set out to do--disrupt the Gulf War consensus, challenge the U. S. containment policy, and focus world attention on the economic suffering of ordinary Iraqis. See Michael Jansen, "Saddam's Phoney Crisis," Middle East International 21 October 1994: 4.

<sup>12</sup> Liesl Graz, "A Population Abused," Middle East International 2 December 1994: 12-13.

<sup>13</sup> Fuller, Symposium, 8.

<sup>14</sup> Lake, 48.

<sup>15</sup> Graham E. Fuller, Iraq in the Next Decade: Will Iraq Survive Until 2002?, RAND Report N-3591-DAG, 51-69, 81-82., Indyk, Symposium, 3 , and Rouleau, 72

<sup>16</sup> Fuller, Iraq in the Next Decade, 86.

<sup>17</sup> Gerald Butt, "Arabs Shun Saddam," Middle East International 21 October 1994: 6.

<sup>18</sup> Edward G. Shirley, "The Iran Policy Trap," Foreign Policy 96 (1994): 75., and Lake, 48.

<sup>19</sup> Gause, 60 , and Edward B. Atkeson, "The Gulf's Shifting Balance: Will Iran Be Our Next Foe?," Army July 1994. 9-13

<sup>20</sup> Cordesman, 12

<sup>21</sup> Michael Eisenstadt, "De'ja' Vu All Over Again? An Assessment of Iran's Military Buildup," Iran's Strategic Intentions and Capabilities, McNair Paper 29, ed. Patrick Clawson (Washington, D. C. 1994) 148.

<sup>22</sup> Lake, 54 , and Marr, 15



<sup>23</sup> Gause, 60 , and Eisenstadt, 149

<sup>24</sup> Laura Drake, "Iraq After Sanctions: Re-Evaluating Foreign Policy," Middle East International 5 August 1994. 17-18 , Eisenstadt, 149 , and Gause, 60.

<sup>25</sup> Marr, 16

<sup>26</sup> Lake, 54.

<sup>27</sup> Fuller, Iraq in the Next Decade, vii.

<sup>28</sup> Marr, 17. However, while it can be argued that the Kurds may be willing to settle in the short run for a semi-autonomous arrangement inside Iraq, the long-term goal for many Kurds is an independent "Kurdistan". See Hugh Pope, "Iraqi Kurdistan. Factions Make Peace," Middle East International 2 December 1994: 13., and Fuller, Iraq in the Next Decade, 5.

<sup>29</sup> To help alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people, U.N. Resolutions 706 and 712 permit Iraq to sell limited quantities of oil to finance the purchase of food and other humanitarian items. The sale and distribution of goods would, however, be monitored by the U.N. To date, Saddam has refused to even negotiate the implementation of these resolutions, claiming the procedures infringe upon Iraqi sovereignty. The U.S. position is that it is therefore Saddam who is responsible for his own people's plight. See Indyk, Symposium, 4., and Dowty, 179.

<sup>30</sup> Mattair, 28-29

<sup>31</sup> Mattair, 28 , and Rouleau, 68.

<sup>32</sup> Godfrey Jansen, "Saddam Sees the Light?," Middle East International 18 November 1994: 8-9

<sup>33</sup> Donald Neff, "Clinton Faces Down Saddam Hussein," Middle East International 21 October 1994 3 , John Lancaster, "Iraq Fights Sanctions with Hospitality, Conciliation," The Washington Post 9 February 1995: A23 , and Rouleau, 66

<sup>34</sup> According to Dowty and others, perhaps the best argument for maintaining the sanctions is that they help force the Iraqis to live with the U N. on-site weapons inspection teams. So long as the inspectors are in place, the Iraqis cannot restart their clandestine nuclear program. However, while Saddam cannot be trusted to live up to the resolutions once the sanctions are lifted, the long-term monitoring provisions of the resolutions, good intelligence, tough export controls, and the threat of force can hopefully keep a lid on the Iraqi weapons program until the Saddam regime is gone. At any rate, the international consensus necessary to maintain the sanctions until the U S is satisfied the Iraqi program is forever out of business simply no longer exists. See Dowty, 189 , Mattair, 30 , and Drake, 17. Additionally, Saddam is unlikely to ever

meet U N demands over human rights. He could not do so and still remain in power, and, as Madeline Albright, American ambassador to the U N , pointed out, "the world cares more about the Iraqi people than Saddam does." See "What Can Be Done About Iraq?," editorial, Middle East International 21 October 1994, 2., Jansen, 8., and Mattair, 32.

<sup>35</sup> Dowty, 184., and Rouleau, 68

<sup>36</sup> George Joffe, "Sanctions and Crime," Middle East International 10 June 1994 11., Rouleau, 64., and Lancaster, "Sanctions Impoverish Iraq's Middle Class," A20. Additionally, according to Rouleau, Iraqi dissident groups based in London have concluded that the "sanctions are in fact now causing more deaths and suffering than the regime itself," and that "it is unjust to punish an innocent population for the crimes of a dictator over which they have no control." See Rouleau, 69.

<sup>37</sup> Dowty, 184.

<sup>38</sup> Fuller, Iraq in the Next Decade, 28-29.

<sup>39</sup> Dowty. 193

<sup>40</sup> Rouleau, 69 , Dowty, 192

<sup>41</sup> "What Can Be Done About Iraq," 2., Neff, 3., and Rouleau, 66-68 Even a New York Times editorial on 2 August, 1994 accused Washington of "changing the rules" and "displaying an overly creative interpretation of UN resolutions "

<sup>42</sup> Mattair, 41 , Gause, 61

<sup>43</sup> Lancaster, "Iraq Fights Sanctions with Hospitality," A23., Joffe, 11., and Neff, 3

<sup>44</sup> Marr, 16., and Jansen, 8 The Turks claim the oil embargo has cost them between \$10 and \$20 billion. See Rouleau, 70

<sup>45</sup> Cordesman, 20. Also see Marr, 17

<sup>46</sup> Significantly, Ambassador Albright recently signaled the U S willingness to use force against Iraq unilaterally, if necessary (Rouleau, 67) There is, however, also a downside to the robust, aggressive American military presence necessary to contain Iraq. As David Long has pointed out, the longer we are compelled to maintain substantial forces in the region, the more likely we are to wear out our welcome (Long, 125). Additionally, many Arabs remain deeply suspicious of any Western military action against an Arab nation, no matter how serious the provocation. We must, therefore, continue to keep our presence in the region as low key as circumstances permit, and act in concert with Arab allies whenever possible. See Ghassan Salame', "Is am and the West," Foreign Policy (Spring 1993) 36-37 and E G H Joffe,

"Relations Between the Middle East and The West," Middle East Journal 48 2 (1994) 252-254

<sup>47</sup> Mattair, 36. However, it must be noted that current U.N. resolutions do not adequately protect the Shi'ite "Marsh Arabs" in southern Iraq from Iraqi ground forces. See Graz, 12.

<sup>48</sup> Andrew Duncan, "Some Carrot, Not Too Much Stick for Saddam Hussein," Asia-Pacific Defense Reporter October/November 1994: 17., and Cordesman, 13.

<sup>49</sup> Fuller, Iraq in the Next Decade, 48.

<sup>50</sup> Mattair, 37.

<sup>51</sup> Rouleau, 62.

<sup>52</sup> Cordesman, 12-14.

<sup>53</sup> Atkeson, 9.

<sup>54</sup> Clinton, 174. Additionally, the U.N. commissions field officer in Baghdad, Jaako Ylitalo, recently stated "Our commission is convinced it is all over. It is watertight. We have faith in the work we have done." See Jansen, 5.